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Research Article

Misinformation more likely to use non-specific authority
references: Twitter analysis of two COVID-19 myths
This research examines the content, timing, and spread of COVID-19 misinformation and subsequent
debunking efforts for two COVID-19 myths. COVID-19 misinformation tweets included more non-specific
authority references (e.g., “Taiwanese experts”, “a doctor friend”), while debunking tweets included more
specific and verifiable authority references (e.g., the CDC, the World Health Organization, Snopes).
Findings illustrate a delayed debunking response to COVID-19 misinformation, as it took seven days for
debunking tweets to match the quantity of misinformation tweets. The use of non-specific authority
references in tweets was associated with decreased tweet engagement, suggesting the importance of
citing specific sources when refuting health misinformation.
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Research questions
•
•
•

How did COVID-19 misinformation tweets and debunking tweets differ in their use of authority
references?
How long did it take COVID-19 debunking tweets to match the quantity of COVID-19
misinformation tweets?
How did the use of authority references relate to the spread of COVID-19 misinformation?

Essay summary
•
•

•

1

Twitter posts related to COVID-19 misinformation were collected, coded, and analyzed.
Misinformation tweets received a head start that provided early momentum. It took seven days
for debunking tweets to equal the quantity of misinformation tweets, a delay that provided
opportunity for misinformation to spread on social networks. After the inflection point at seven
days, the number of debunking tweets accelerated and outpaced misinformation.
The use of authority references in COVID-19 tweets related to user engagement. Tweets that
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•

•

included references to non-specific authority sources were less likely to receive likes or retweets
from other users.
Misinformation tweets were more likely to reference non-specific authority sources (e.g.,
“Taiwanese researchers”, “top medical officials”). Debunking tweets were more likely to
reference specific or verifiable authority sources (e.g., the CDC, the World Health Organization, a
Snopes article debunking the claim).
This research suggests references to non-specific authority sources should present a warning sign
to suspect misinformation. If a recommendation is attributed to a general non-specific authority
source, users should heighten their suspicion for misinformation.

Implications
As coronavirus infections surged globally, people turned to social media to learn how to protect
themselves from the emergent threat (Volkin, 2020). Social media is an important tool for communicating
information during times of crisis (Austin et al., 2012; Houston et al., 2014). However, misinformation for
COVID-19 emulated the trail of the virus and spread person-to-person through online social networks
(Frenkel et al., 2020). Misinformation related to COVID-19 included misleading, false, and manipulated
content (Brennen et al., 2020). Misleading information exacerbates health problems and increases the
workload of health organizations who must exert resources to squashing the false claims (van der Meer
& Jin, 2020).
The COVID-19 “infodemic” created a multi-layered problem for risk communication (Krause et al.,
2020). In addition to the health risk of contracting COVID-19, searching online for information became a
risk in itself through the possibility of encountering false claims (Krause et al., 2020). Twitter users often
fail to detect rumors (Wang & Zhuang, 2018). Misinformation for infectious diseases has focused primarily
on issues related to transmission, prevention, treatment, and vaccination (Nsoesie & Oladeji, 2020). The
false claims in misinformation can produce negative health outcomes and lead people to take harmful
actions in search of a remedy, such as gargling bleach in attempt to eliminate a virus.
Misinformation tweets and debunking tweets differed in their use of authority references.
Misinformation tweets were more likely to attribute information to non-verifiable authority sources, such
as “Taiwanese researchers” or “health experts.” Debunking efforts included more specific and verifiable
authority appeals, such as providing a link to a fact-checking article from Snopes, or attributing the
information to a specific organization, such as the CDC. In addition, debunking tweets were more likely to
come from verified users. In our sample, 93 of 645 (14.4%) debunking tweets came from verified users,
compared to seven of 577 (1.2%) misinformation tweets, indicating verified users were mostly not
responsible for posting the misinformation. However, verified users often have larger follower counts and
may create greater total impressions, or tweet views, due to the size of their following (Wang & Zhuang,
2017). During crisis events, users interact most frequently with verified users (Hunt et al., 2020). Future
research should examine specifically the relationship between verified users, tweet timing, and total
impressions during surging misinformation events.
Our results indicate that references to non-specific authority sources should act as a signal to increase
one’s guard against potential misinformation attempts. Users should view general attributions to
authority references as a guideline for raising their suspicion of the accuracy of the tweet, as
misinformation tweets were more likely to include ambiguous, non-specific cues to authority references
(e.g., “medical professionals”, “a nurse friend”). Intentional deliberation can reduce misinformation
spread (Bago et al., 2020). To contrast these findings, research should examine the prevalence of nonspecific and specific authority appeals in different health contexts. Current results suggest the appearance
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of an ambiguous authority appeal in health messages should lead people to pause and deliberate on the
accuracy of the claim.
The use of authority appeals in COVID-19 tweets related to user engagement. Misinformation tweets
with non-specific authority references were less likely to receive engagement from other users in the form
of likes or retweets. The inclusion of specific authority references did not increase or decrease the
likelihood of tweet engagement by other users. Future work can advance these findings by examining
categories of abstract and specific authority appeals and their effect on tweet engagement. Likes on social
media influence credibility perceptions of health information (Borah & Xiao, 2018), and credibility can
affect intentions to adopt healthy behaviors (Hu & Sundar, 2010). The inclusion of authority appeals may
also influence credibility judgments of misinformation and debunking tweets. Source credibility is
paramount when attempting to correct inaccurate health information (Bode & Vraga, 2018).
Debunking represents an important public strategy to reduce the persistence of misinformation (Chan
et al., 2017). For debunking to be necessary, the misinformation must first occur. However, findings
indicate that debunking tweets lagged behind misinformation by several days before accelerating in
frequency. The delay between misinformation emergence and debunking response provided an
opportunity for the misinformation to spread. The observed delay in debunking response is problematic
because even minimally repetitive exposure to fake news can increase the perceived accuracy of the
information (Pennycook et al., 2018). Once people believe misinformation, they tend to do so with strong
conviction and correcting the information becomes more difficult (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).
Improving the efficacy of debunking efforts remains a priority (van der Meer & Jin, 2020). The current
results indicate avoiding non-specific authority references is a good first step for debunking efforts, as
non-specific authority references had a negative relationship with tweet engagement. In our sample, only
1.7% of debunking tweets included a non-specific authority appeal. Twitter users frequently provide
website links to debunk false rumors (Hunt et al., 2020). Debunking efforts should focus on including links
and appeals to specific authority references. Of note, the quantity of debunking efforts differed between
the two myths analyzed. Specifically, users focused greater attention to debunking the gargle myth than
the hold breath myth, perhaps because gargling liquids such as bleach presents a greater immediate
threat to people’s health. This result suggests the perceived danger of health misinformation may affect
likelihood of debunking response. When perceived danger of the misinformation is high, people may be
more motivated to debunk the myth.
Proactive communication is vital for the successful reduction of COVID-19 misinformation (Jamieson
& Albarracín, 2020). Prompting users to ask why they believe the information to be true can be an
effective gatekeeping device to reduce sharing of false claims (Fazio, 2020). However, misinformation is
often blended with accurate information, making it difficult for users to discern myth from fact. For
example, the claim that people should gargle a liquid to avoid COVID-19 was frequently embedded with
other health recommendations, such as getting adequate sleep or exercise. Understanding the effects of
messages with complete misinformation versus partial misinformation remains a priority for future
research.
Users and organizations must keep in mind that misinformation campaigns related to COVID-19 are
far from over. Rather, organizations should anticipate and expect misinformation attempts in regard to
future COVID-19 issues such as vaccine development, testing, and treatment. A faster response time for
debunking efforts will be critical for halting future misinformation efforts before they build momentum.
Organizations should treat misinformation campaigns as a known threat, fully expecting for
misinformation to spread during a crisis rather than being surprised by the surplus of myths and false
claims. Anticipating the existence of misinformation attempts may hasten the efficiency and strengthen
the efficacy of future debunking efforts.
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Findings
Finding 1: Misinformation and debunking tweets included two types of authority appeals: non-specific
authority references and specific authority references. Misinformation tweets included more appeals to
non-specific authority references. Debunking tweets included more appeals to specific authority
references.
Misinformation tweets and debunking tweets differed in their use of authority appeals. Two types of
authority references appeared in the tweets, including appeals to non-specific authority references and
appeals to specific authority references. For example, tweets could include a non-specific authority
reference (e.g., “Taiwanese experts”, “top medical officials”) or a specific authority reference (e.g., the
CDC, Factcheck.org). Misinformation tweets were significantly more likely than debunking tweets to
include a non-specific authority reference (12.3% misinformation tweets vs. 1.7% debunking tweets).
Debunking tweets were significantly more likely than misinformation tweets to include appeals to specific
authority references (45.4% of debunking tweets vs. 9.5% of misinformation tweets), 2(2, n = 1222) =
218.84, p < .001).
Misinformation tweets and debunking tweets also differed in how frequently they included an
authority reference. Overall, debunking tweets were more likely to include an authority reference than
misinformation tweets. Misinformation tweets used an authority appeal in 126 of 577 tweets (21.8%).
Debunking tweets included an authority appeal in 304 of 645 tweets (47.1%), which is significantly more
often (2[1, n = 1222] = 85.44, p < .001).

The Use of Authority References in the COVID-19
Misinformation and Debunking Tweets
47.1%

45.4%

21.8%
12.3%

9.5%
1.7%

Included an authority
reference

Non-specific authority
reference
Misinformation

Specific authority
reference

Debunking

Figure 1. The use of authority references in the COVID-19 misinformation and debunking tweets. Debunking tweets were more
likely than misinformation tweets to include an authority reference. Misinformation tweets were more likely than debunking
tweets to include appeals to non-specific authority references. Debunking tweets were more likely than misinformation tweets
to include appeals to specific authority references. Differences significant at p < .001.

McGlynn; Baryshevtsev; Dayton 5

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the analyzed tweets
Misinformation tweets

Debunking tweets

n = 577

n = 645

Hold Breath

Statistics
300
52.0%

199

30.9%

Gargle

277

48.0%

446

69.1%

Verified User

7

1.2%

93

14.4%

Debunking (overt)

-

-

506

78.4%

Debunking (suspicion)

-

-

139

21.6%

Authority Appeal

126

21.8%

304

47.1%

Non-specific appeal

71

12.3%

11

1.7%

Specific appeal

55

9.5%

293

45.4%

Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Followers Count

3,285

12,037

0

162,632

160,965

1,878,676

0

45,907,596

Following Count

1,782

4,513

0

52,634

1,505

2,939

0

28,216

Status Count

21,912 45004

2

423,842

47,300

158,953

2

3,401,865

Retweets

11

141

0

2,836

29

291

0

6375

Likes

30.5

374

0

8,270

90

1025

0

24320

Finding 2: Debunking tweets lagged behind misinformation tweets before accelerating in frequency. Seven
days passed before debunking tweets matched the quantity of misinformation tweets.
Examining the two myths combined, the results indicate it took seven days for debunking tweets to match
the quantity of COVID-19 misinformation tweets. Misinformation for COVID-19 began picking up speed
on 3/7/20, while debunking tweets did not match the total frequency of misinformation tweets until
seven days later on 3/14/20. After the inflection point, debunking tweets accelerated and reached similar
levels to the peak of COVID-19 misinformation tweets. In our sample, peak levels of debunking trailed the
misinformation peak by five days. After that point, misinformation and debunking tweets receded to
similar levels. A cumulative analysis of misinformation and debunking for the two myths shows an
acceleration of total misinformation on 3/11/20 and a gradual rise in debunking thereafter, with an
increase in aggregate debunking between 3/13/20 and 3/19/20.
Examining the two myths separately, both cases illustrate a sharp initial ramp of misinformation,
followed by debunking responses that trailed the misinformation attempts. Notably, despite our data
including similar amounts of misinformation tweets for both the “hold breath” and “gargle” myths,
debunking tweets focused greater effort on refuting the gargle myth. The cumulative analysis for the hold
breath myth indicates total debunking efforts did not overtake misinformation for the hold breath myth
at any point. In comparison, debunking tweets for the gargle myth rose sharply on 3/14/20 and exceeded
the cumulative misinformation total for the gargle myth on 3/18/20. Figures two through seven illustrate
the relative frequency of misinformation tweets and debunking tweets over time, from both a per day
and a cumulative perspective.
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Combined Myths Tweets per Day
100
90
80
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40
30
20
10
0

Misinformation

Debunking

Figure 2. COVID-19 gargle myth and hold breath myth aggregate totals of misinformation tweets vs. debunking tweets over
time. The solid line indicates the days when the difference in proportion between misinformation and debunking tweets was
significant (p < .05) according to a Chi-square Test for Independence. The dotted line indicates the days when the proportion of
the two types of tweets did not differ significantly.

Combined Myths Cumulative Tweets
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600
500
400

300
200
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Misinformation
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Figure 3. Combined myths cumulative misinformation tweets vs. debunking tweets over time.
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Hold Breath Myth Tweets per Day
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Misinformation
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Figure 4. Hold breath misinformation tweets vs. hold breath debunking tweets over time. The solid line indicates the days
when the difference in proportion between misinformation and debunking tweets was significant (p < .05) according to a Chisquare Test for Independence. The dotted line indicates the days when the proportion of the two types of tweets did not differ
significantly.

Hold Breath Myth Cumulative Tweets
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

Misinformation

Debunking

Figure 5. Hold breath myth cumulative misinformation tweets vs. debunking tweets over time.
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Gargle Myth Tweets per Day
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Figure 6. Gargle misinformation tweets vs. gargle debunking tweets over time. The solid line indicates the days when the
difference in proportion between misinformation and debunking tweets was significant (p < .05) according to a Chi-square Test
for Independence. The dotted line indicates the days when the proportion of the two types of tweets did not differ significantly.

Gargle Myth Cumulative Tweets
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Figure 7. Gargle myth cumulative misinformation tweets vs. debunking tweets over time.
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Finding 3: The inclusion of non-specific authority references in tweets was associated with decreased user
engagement. Tweets that included non-specific authority references were less likely to receive likes or
retweets from other users.
The use of non-specific authority references in COVID-19 tweets was related to decreased tweet
engagement. Users were less likely to engage with tweets that included non-specific authority references,
indicating that references to ambiguous authority cues may have negative effects on user interaction. This
effect was driven by misinformation tweets, as the effect was not present when testing debunking tweets
separately. Although non-specific authority references had a negative relationship with tweet
engagement, including a specific authority appeal did not increase or decrease the likelihood of
engagement. Table 2 provides the model statistics and odds ratios for the likelihood of tweet engagement
for the misinformation tweets in the form of retweets and likes.
Table 2. Misinformation GEE logistic regression coefficients for likelihood of retweets and likes
Model Fit
Retweets

Likes

QIC

3235.88

3593.05

Variable

Odds Ratio [95% CI]

Odds Ratio [95% CI]

Verified Tweet

0.10* [0.02, 0.46]

0.63 [0.12, 3.43]

Follower Count

1.10** [1.08, 1.12]

1.08** [1.07, 1.10]

Non-specific Authority

0.10* [0.02, 0.51]

0.07* [0.02, 0.37]

Note: If the odds ratio is below 1, then as the predictor variable increases or is present, the likelihood of tweet
engagement decreases. If the odds ratio is above 1, then as the predictor variable increases or is present, the
likelihood of tweet engagement also increases. Follower Count odds ratio should be interpreted as an increase in
the odds for an increase of 1000 followers. QIC = Quasi-Likelihood under Independence Model
Criterion. *p < .01. **p < .001.

Methods
Data Collection
Tweets related to two false COVID-19 pieces of advice (henceforth referred to as myths) were collected
via Twitter’s search API. A total of 1,493 tweets were collected for this study. The two COVID-19 myths
were selected among several false claims reported by factchecking organizations (e.g., Snopes.com,
Factcheck.org). The myths were selected because they were the least ambiguous (i.e., all or most of its
elements were agreed upon by experts as clearly false) and the myths were findable on Twitter with a
keyword-based query. The first myth claimed that gargling a liquid (e.g., warm water, saltwater, vinegar,
mouthwash, bleach) would kill the coronavirus when the liquid entered the throat. The second myth
claimed that a person could self-diagnose COVID-19 infection by holding their breath for a certain period
of time. Typically, the claim was to hold your breath for 10 seconds, but the length of time varied slightly
across tweets.
Once the two misinformation claims for the analysis were selected, we created search queries for
each myth. To collect the tweets, we used the premium 30-day sandbox (free) search API. This specific
API allowed us to collect tweets within the previous 30 days, which permitted reaching back to March 3,
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2020. At the time of data collection, we were limited to collecting 7,000 historical tweets. Therefore, we
restricted the search parameters to a maximum of 200 tweets per day. The search API returned both
retweets and quote tweets, which provided the ability to collect the original tweets shared by users.
Retweets were removed from the final sample, but the original tweet was retained. For quote tweets, we
preserved both the user-entered text and the text from the original tweet. These criteria resulted in the
total of 1,493 collected tweets. Next we used the Python package Tweet Parser, provided by Twitter, to
extract the necessary elements of each tweet.
Content Analysis
After collecting the tweets, we engaged in content analysis. In the first round of coding, each individual
tweet was labeled misinformation, debunking, or irrelevant. A misinformation tweet was defined as a
message that stated the myth, urged others to adopt the myth’s recommendation, or otherwise made no
attempt at disconfirming or denying the myth. If a tweet indicated skepticism of the claim or disbelief of
the myth, the tweet was labeled debunking. Debunking tweets were defined as messages designed to
correct or refute misinformation. Debunking tweets frequently referenced media articles to refute the
claim (e.g., Snopes, Factcheck.org), or otherwise addressed the inaccuracy of the myth (e.g., “Fact check:
Holding your breath for 10 seconds is not a coronavirus test”, “Gargling vinegar will not protect you from
COVID-19”). Within the label of debunking, for descriptive purposes, we then specified if the debunking
tweet represented overt debunking or merely expressed suspicion of the myth. The two types of
debunking tweets were combined for the current analysis.
Throughout this analysis, we use the terms authority appeal and authority reference interchangeably.
To identify the inclusion of authority appeals in the COVID-19 tweets, we conducted closed coding of each
individual tweet, identifying the presence or absence of authority appeals. An authority appeal was
defined as referencing an individual or organization that has knowledge about COVID-19. Although some
individuals or organizations referenced may not be universally considered an authority on a viral outbreak
(e.g., political leaders), we decided to code such references as an authority appeal because the authority
referenced may have influence on their supporters. Examples of authorities referenced in the tweets
included emergency room doctors, nurses, research centers, empirical studies, news outlets, political
leaders, and universities. If a tweet attributed the information to such an authority, we coded the tweet
as including an authority appeal.
The manner in which authority appeals were referenced varied across tweets. At times the authority
references reflected direct statements, such as, “According to medical experts at Stanford, you can selfdiagnose COVID-19 by holding your breath for 10 seconds.” Other tweets included an article link to a
specific authority reference. In that case, the news outlet associated with the article acted as the authority
appeal (e.g., Snopes, BBC, World Health Organization). We did not consider links to blogs to be an
authority appeal. For certain tweets, images were included in the original post, which we also examined.
If the tweet included an image of a medical professional or the logo of an organization, we coded the
tweet as including an authority appeal.
In addition to identifying the presence or absence of authority appeals in the tweets, we coded each
appeal as either a specific authority appeal or a non-specific authority appeal. A specific authority appeal
was defined as a message that included a name or a verifiable authority, such as Factcheck.org or the CDC.
Non-specific authority appeals included messages that did not identify a specific person or organization,
relying instead on ambiguous authority references. Examples of non-specific authority references
included “Japanese doctors” and “advice from a nurse friend.”
Finally, we removed any irrelevant tweets from the sample. Irrelevant tweets included terms from
the search query but were unrelated to the myth. For example, some tweets described general tips about
breathing exercises to boost immunity against COVID-19, but were not claiming that the breathing
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exercises were a self-diagnosis tool. Tweets asking an open-ended question of whether or not the myth
was accurate were marked irrelevant, as they were not clearly misinformation or debunking.

Category of tweet

Table 3. COVID-19 example tweets by category.
COVID-19 myth
Gargle myth

Hold breath myth

Misinformation

Gargles with warm water & salt or
vinegar and drinking lots of warm
water can wash away #Coronavirus
when its clinging to the throat in first 4
days after entering the body, So gargle
everyday pl spread this info through
retweets #CoronaOutbreak

A simple coronavirus test you can do
yourself ... Take a deep breath and hold
your breath for 10 seconds … After you
have held your breath for 10 seconds
and your not coughing, experiencing
chest pains, tightness or any discomfort
your probably not infected with
coronavirus.

Debunking
(overt)

WARNING!! FAKE! While gargling some
combination of warm water, salt, and
vinegar has long been used as a means
of relieving symptoms related to colds
and flus, such as sore throats, there’s
No evidence that it can help drive out
infections from the COVID-19.

If anyone is saying to hold your breath
for 10 seconds as a test for
coronavirus... this has been debunked.

Debunking
(expressed
suspicion)

Meanwhile I saw someone we went to
high school with share something that
gargling with salt water would kill the
coronavirus and it wasn’t a joke

Anyone hear about the 10 second test?
If you can hold your breath for 10
seconds you don't or possibly don't
have the coronavirus. Different
theories about this on social media. I'm
not buying it personally. I stopped after
15 seconds but it proves nothing imo.

Non-specific
authority appeal
(misinformation)

From a medical friend in the US. Pls
share! Coronavirus before it reaches
lungs it remains in the throat for 4 days
n at this time he/she begins to cough n
has throat pains. Drinks a lot of water n
gargling with warm water and salt or
vinegar eliminates the virus. Share pls.

Taiwan experts provide a simple selfcheck. Take a deep breath, hold your
breath for more than 10 seconds. If you
complete it without coughing, without
discomfort, stiffness or tightness, etc, it
proves there is no Fibrosis in the lungs,
basically indicates no infection.
#COVID19

Specific
authority appeal
(debunking)

Sorry, gargling with salt water won’t kill
off the virus, it’s a myth:
https://t.co/dIieS6ysWq

You can hold your breath for ten
seconds? That’s nice — but you might
be infected with COVID-19 anyway.
Good ol’ @snopes says so.
https://t.co/MbcuwuBqUG
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Appendix: Supplementary methods
Twitter Search Query
We limited our search to English tweets only and variations of the term “COVID-19”. Specifically, the API
queries we used were:
Gargle Myth
lang:en (gargle OR gargling)
(covid19 OR coronavirus OR covid-19 OR c19 OR cov OR covid_19 OR covid)
Hold Breath Myth
lang:en hold (breath OR breathe) seconds
(covid19 OR coronavirus OR covid-19 OR c19 OR cov OR covid_19 OR covid)
Data Analysis
To test whether authority appeals predicted tweet engagement, we fit a negative binomial model. The
negative binomial model accounted for the large variance (i.e., overdispersion) of retweet and like counts.
Part of the overdispersion was caused by one extreme outlier (i.e., one tweet with greater than 10,000
likes), which caused the model fit to be unreliable. As a result, we restricted the number of likes to fewer
than 10,000. Control variables for the analysis included whether or not the account was verified and the
number of followers for the account.
Coding Process and Creation of the Codebook
With regard to the coding of the tweets for content analysis, the first two authors coded the first 300
tweets collaboratively (approximately 20% of the dataset). During the initial coding of the tweets, a
codebook was developed to create categories, definitions, and examples for each code. Upon creation of
the codebook, the first 300 tweets were then recoded to account for any potential changes in coding
decisions that may have developed throughout the coding process. This step of recoding helps to promote
stability (Krippendorff, 2004) and ensure the coding decisions did not change over time. The first two
researchers then divided the remainder of the dataset evenly and coded the tweets individually. If one of
the researchers was uncertain on how to code a particular tweet, the two researchers discussed the
coding of the tweet collaboratively. All disagreements were discussed until agreement was met. This
process created the set of coded tweets for the analysis.
Intercoder Reliability
To assess intercoder reliability, a researcher blind to the purpose of the study was trained using the
codebook created for the study. Reliability between coders was then assessed through an open-source
calculation tool for reliability analysis (Freelon, 2010). As our data included two sets of observations and
binary coding categories, scores for Scott’s pi, Cohen’s kappa, and Krippendorff’s alpha were
asymptotically equal (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). We used percent agreement and Krippendorrf’s alpha
as a guideline for acceptable reliability (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). Percent agreement was above 90%
for each category, and Krippendorff’s alpha indicated acceptable levels of reliability, ranging from .70 to
.89 (Krippendorff, 2004). Krippendorff’s alpha accounts for the possibility of chance agreements, which is
a reason why a coding category with a higher percent agreement may have a lower Krippendorff’s alpha.
Table 4 illustrates the reliability statistics for each tweet category. The codes assigned to each tweet are
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available in the replication materials. The codebook created for the current study is also available in the
replication materials. The codebook includes descriptions of the coding categories, definitions for each
category, and example tweets for each coding category.
Table 4. Intercoder reliability statistics for the coded tweets (N = 1,493)
Category
Tweet

of

Percent
N
Agreement Agreements

N
Disagreements

Scott's
π

Cohen's
κ

Krippendorff's
α

Irrelevant

93.64%

1398

95

0.77

0.77

0.77

Misinformation

92.63%

1383

110

0.85

0.85

0.85

Debunking –
Overt

94.98%

1418

75

0.89

0.89

0.89

Debunking –
Suspicion
Authority
Appeal
Non-specific
Authority
Appeal
Specific
Authority
Appeal

94.31%

1408

85

0.88

0.88

0.88

90.82%

1356

137

0.79

0.79

0.79

96.45%

1440

53

0.70

0.70

0.70

93.77%

1400

93

0.83

0.83

0.83

